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 The Weak Must Not Any More Than The Strong 
 
 
R.Radhakrishnan 
 
 
Greek crisis is in the same breath and in the same thought Europe’s crisis. It is not 
also Europe’s crisis, or by extension or only epiphenomenally Europe’s crisis. The 
relationship between Greece and Europe at large is one of irrefragable co-evalness: 
a relationship of identity in difference and difference in identity.  It is an act of 
unabashed ideological disavowal to pathologise and singularise the Greek crisis 
and read it out of solidarity with the European situation. The purpose of this panel 
is to explore critically the relationship between solidarity as an a priori and the 
historical emergence of the putative ‘weakest link,’ a connection which is all too 
quickly criminalised and stigmatised so that solidarity can be reterritorialised 
hegemonically, in this instance, with the German imprimatur masquerading as 
Europe’s proper name. How indeed did the weakest link emerge as a historical 
consequence of European solidarity? The answer is of course obvious and self-
evident: solidarity was always already structured in dominance and structural 
unevenness. Any structuring of solidarity implies a fundamental double-
consciousness whereby every unit within the solidarity is both for itself in 
autonomy; and heteronomous, in good faith with respect to the larger collectivity of 
which it is a part, though not a fungible part. From Germany to Greece, each nation 
is an ‘unequally equal’ part of the European continuum on the assumption of the 
underlying rationale: from each according to its ability, to each according to its 
need.1  In other words, the weaker partners in their very less than equalness bear 
on their body politic the equal sovereignty of all Europe. If the solidarity, from its 
very ideological conception, was receptive in affirmation to the anomalies and 
contradictions of an uneven collectivity, why is it then that during times of crisis, a 
crisis written inevitably into the very constitution of the solidarity, the weakest link 
is turned into the singular and localised symptom of the crisis? Why does it become 
unthinkable to articulate Europe from the point of view of and in the name of the 
weakest link?  Why does the term ‘weakest link’ turn from a mere descriptive 
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phrase into a stigma?2 Why is it made to seem that the more than equal partners 
within Europe are being gratuitously generous in their acts of ‘bail out?’  Isn’t that 
their function and obligation? Why does it not sound egregiously unethical and 
invasive when the rest of Europe and the financial institutions thereof interfere 
with the internal sovereignty of Greece and demand that the Greek nationals be 
subjected to measures of austerity not sanctioned by their own government?  Why 
should Greece be governed and represented by an extra-territorial authority rather 
than by its own elected representatives? 
The crisis by and large has been coded as economic with politics tagged as a 
mere by product or as unnecessary ideological baggage. Gone from the discourse is 
the category of ‘political economy’ that actualised the relationship between politics 
and economics as one of on going tension, with economics pretending, in the name 
of the marketplace, to be value-free and neutral, and politics insisting on fair play 
and the necessary safeguards and mechanisms of distributive justice, and issues of 
equal representation and sovereignty in the context of unequal economic power. 
But a Europe governed primarily by financial institutions (The European System of 
Financial Supervision, ESFS) functions as a post-historical and post-political 
programme of action that perceives politics and ideology as the naturalised 
preserve of dominant or hegemonic nations. In other words, within the unequal 
solidarity known as Europe, a solidarity articulated on the basis of inequality 
among the constituent nation states, political sovereignty is no more a principle of 
equality among nation states. Instead, political sovereignty has become a 
conditional guarantee: if the weaker nation states are prepared to violate their 
intra-national imperatives at the altar of pan-European survivability, then they will 
be granted the freedom to be politically sovereign. A people who cannot afford any 
more austerity, any more penny pinching, will have to immiserate themselves in an 
act of neo-colonial surrender to ‘pure’ economic restructuring: or else, they will be 
expelled from the Union.  In this neo-colonial formula, Greece’s political 
accountability to itself is violently sublated and yoked to a ‘higher ideal’ it cannot 
afford, but afford alas it must: or else.  The choice facing the weaker nations is: 
Lose, Lose.  Either you lose by failing to comply with the demands made by Greater 
Europe and thereby get booted out; or comply and suffer the consequences of a 
pyrrhic triumph over one’s own political will. 
The plebiscite initiated by Mr. Tsipras ended up thematising the many 
contradictions and incommensurabilities that constituted the crisis. The most 
important questions were: Who should have the authority to decide and on what 
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mandate? Who is to decide, and on the basis of what expertise, what is best for 
Greece and its people? The first question is legal-procedural, and the second 
substantive; and of course, the two questions are deeply inter-related. What if 
populist will made the wrong choice? What if the right answer emanated from an 
illegitimate source? Should the choice be national, politically speaking? Who are 
the people in this case: people interpellated by the vague but important idea called 
Europe, or people interpellated by the nation state called Greece? What should be 
the correct and normative relationship between the two interpellations; and 
furthermore, should there be a clash between the two, which sovereignty should 
prevail? In this context, is Europe a transnational idea, an intangible and yet 
empirically binding ‘spiritual principle,’ to invoke Ernest Renan, an essentialist 
article of faith?3 Or is Europe in fact an imperative that shores up trans-
nationalism in the name of dominant nation states? What is the connection 
between populism as people’s experiential-existential will and the juridical 
template under which people become ‘political people’ as Greek citizens or 
European trans-citizens? What was interesting in the case of the Tsipras-inspired 
plebiscite was that in one fell move the Greek people were simultaneously re-
empowered as Greek subjects and called upon to make the decision of their lives, 
and demoted from their status of ‘demos’ to the mere affective visceral-animality of 
the multitude.   
The sovereignty of the Greek people/subjects was thrown into taxonomic and 
conceptual disarray between intra-national Greek sovereignty and European trans-
national hegemony. So who are the Greek subjects/people in this context of 
profound dissidence between Greece and EU?  When they speak, what would be the 
consequences? Are they just speaking, or, are they ‘speaking for?’ Would it matter 
at all, and to whom, what they decided? Was the plebiscite no more than a 
muscular ritual of political will, full of nothing but symbolism? Why could the case 
not be made, given the trans-national nature of the European Union, that the 
jurisdiction of the Greek plebiscite was, speaking synecdochically, was also 
European in nature? When the Greek people spoke, whether their decision was 
right or wrong, wise or foolish, why would that not resound affirmatively with the 
other national peoples of Europe?   
The abject ambivalence of the plebiscite, caught untenably as it was between the 
political national imaginary and the economic imaginary of the European Union, 
rendered it simultaneously hyper and hypo-political: on the one hand, a political 
parody and on the other a subaltern interrogation with no listener or interlocutor 
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except the embattled insider.4 The real question became: who was watching, who 
was listening? Was the plebiscite an exercise in solipsistic rebellion? Whose bluff 
was being called? Was Tsipras betraying his subjects by absolving himself of the 
responsibility of representation and seeking the utopian spontaneism of direct 
democracy; or was he effectively thumbing his nose at the untenable dominant 
disposition of the European Union in the person of Angela Merkel? After all, the 
people can only exercise their right to choose, but they are not supposed to know 
what is good for them. That is the job of the elected political leaders. The Greek 
subject feels on the one hand both abandoned and empowered by the symbolic 
grandstanding of its chosen leaders; and on the other hand, it is being taught the 
lesson of economic viability by the European Union who by definition cannot speak 
for it. Political stability and self-esteem on the one hand; and on the other hand, 
ruthless economic assimilation, not on their terms, with the European Union. 
Viability has to be either economic or political. Weaker nations (the PIGS whose 
situation has been brilliantly rendered by David Lloyd in this round table) who 
suffer the ailment of economic viability have to perforce sacrifice their right to raise 
the issue of political viability. In a model that privileges economic viability, political 
viability, especially for the weaker nations, can only be a trickle down effect of a 
secure economic viability. No economic viability, ergo, no political viability. 
Now that the political has been weaned away from the economic, and everything 
economic rendered aseptic from political contamination, economic viability can 
now be parsed as pure scientific fact beyond any kind of historical and genealogical 
analysis or unpacking. Some nations and some peoples are just that way: 
economically non-viable. The all-important question: viable or non-violable by 
what standards, and established by what authority, cannot be raised at all. That the 
PIGS, under the new European dispensation, cannot, for systemic and structural 
reasons, live up to their prescribed levels of viability is ‘an ideological fact’ that is 
swept under the rug. In other words, the debacle and the bankruptcy of the PIGS is 
very much an intended consequence of the New European Deal. Even as Europe is 
touted as a transnational ethic, this very ethic requires, as its underlying 
constitutive rationale, the performative reality of the various nation states that 
make up the European continuum.  
The nation-state, under this new episteme, is made thoroughly schizophrenic, 
or perhaps bipolar is the better term. Thus, for example, depending on how you 
view it, the PIGS as nation states remain what they have always been: second class 
citizens at best, or poor relatives under the aegis of the joint family known as 
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Europe. But duplicitously, and at the same time, as poor relatives they are expected 
to partake of, along with their affluent relatives, the menu of a gilt-edged ten star 
restaurant, and divide the bill equally. It is either that, or the other option is: sit at 
the same table, gaze at the same menu, but order just sparkling water, and perhaps 
a minimal salad.  This way, all those who attended the banquet could be seen in 
public view as having walked in and out of the restaurant, hand in hand, in 
absolute egalitarian amity. If some one like a Yanis Varoufakis were to become 
obstreperous enough to shout out in indignation, “Hey, what happened to the 
initial motto of ‘each according to etc……’” that articulates the very basis of the 
solidarity, he would be immediately castigated as a political agitator who is willfully 
misreading a binding economic imperative.  My point, to reiterate, is not to deny 
that the Greek administration has made its own mistakes of irresponsibility, or 
gainsay the reality of the many bailouts. My point is that whereas the strong 
nations in the so-called continuum are effective ‘political economies,’ the PIGS are 
forced to function as depoliticised or deracinated economies or perform the ritual 
of decapitated political will: the ritual of ‘Greek’ with ‘Greek’ under total erasure. 
The continuum is after all not a continuum at all, just as analogously, modernity 
never was an equalizer, but was an instead a continuing perpetrator of colonial 
inequality in the name of a dehistoricised modernity. 
Yanis Varoufakis, begins his recent book with the ironically poignant title with 
an interrogative end (reminding me of Partha Chatterjee’s early work Nationalist 
Thought and the Colonial World?), And the Weak Suffer What They Must?  with a 
few intense childhood recollections of growing up in Greece but with an 
overarching awareness of Europe, Germany in particular.  This early recollection 
gives us a snapshot of Europe then versus Europe now, offering us a study in 
discontinuity. 
 
My family’s strange red blanket ritual began in 1967, the inaugural year of Greece’s 
military dictatorship. Deutsche Welle, the German international Radio station that 
my parents were listening to, became our most precious  ally against the crushing 
power of state propaganda at home: a window  looking out to faraway democratic 
Europe. At the end of each of its hour-long special broadcasts on Greece, my parents 
and I would sit around the dining table while they mulled over the latest news. Not 
understanding fully what they were talking about neither bored me nor upset me.  
For I was gripped by a sense of excitement at the strangeness of our predicament: 
that, to find out what was happening in our own Athens, we had to travel, through the 
airwaves-veiled by a red blanket-to a place called Germany. (1) 
 
What is genuinely bracing and liberating about this recollection, despite the 
besieged and undemocratic condition of Greece at that point in history, is the 
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confidence with which the recollection makes a valid relational connection of 
solidarity between home as present prison and the free world as Europe: far, but 
conceptually and ideologically available and intimate. Athens is instantly 
territorialised, de- and re-territorialised in this recollection as despair and hope, as 
problem and potential solution. On the basis of this organic relationality parsed as 
solidarity, Greece is not branded as lowly beneficiary and Germany anointed as 
noble and philanthropic benefactor. On the contrary, all of Europe is named and 
recognized contradictorily but integrally as dictatorship and democracy. To be 
forced to travel to Germany along the airwaves to know the truth about Germany 
comes across as both topic and exo-topic. There is a relationship of commitment 
and accountability adumbrated here and within the red blanket, Greece in its 
present history of dictatorship and in need of help from free Germany and free 
Europe comes across as both heteronomous and autonomous, in fact 
heteronomous in autonomy and autonomous in heteronomy. If indeed all of 
Europe is a democratic family, then, Greece in need of a security blanket from 
Germany is no different from a down and out family member seeking help from a 
more fortunate and better-placed family unit.  Where is the harm and shame in 
that, or where the so-called magnanimity and charity?   
“The European Union,” Varoufakis argues, as he fast forwards that vision in 
history, “could even pose as a blueprint that the rest of the world might draw 
courage and inspiration from so as to eradicate divisions and establish peaceful 
coexistence across the planet.” He waxes rhapsodic in the name of “a 
commonwealth” to be made “feasible where reason, democracy, respect for human 
rights and a decent social safety net would provide its multinational, multilingual, 
multicultured citizens with the stage on which to become the women and men that 
their talents deserved.” There is the utopic dream “of the erection of common 
institutions, the tearing-down of ludicrous borders that previously scarred the 
continent.” (4). 
This entire imagining is political, ethical, conceptual, and philosophical, and 
helps us in asking the question, “What or Who is Europe?” and what is the nature 
of European commonality?  Is the basis spiritual, religious, economic, cultural, 
political, symbolic? It is interesting to note that in the Varoufakis’s vision, 
Economics is neither named or invoked as a terrain: all the more interesting 
considering that, for God’s sake, he is an economist first and foremost. The reason 
for this seeming oversight, I would argue, is that Varoufakis refuses to yield all 
‘currency’ to the mediation known as Economics. Of course he is aware of all the 
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problems, asymmetries, inequalities, contradictions, and incommensurabilities 
that Economics is home and heir to: but his point is that the putative common 
ground of Europe, the putative common ground as Europe ought not be held 
captive to Economics as the only and/or dominant determinant of solidarity. “Then 
came Wall Street’s implosion in 2008 and the ensuing global disaster. Nothing 
would be the same again.” Ferociously discrediting the facile thesis that divides 
Europe into ant nations and grasshopper nations, Varoufakis makes the case that 
“the real cause of the eurozone crisis” has “nothing to do with the behavior of 
grasshoppers or ants or any such thing. It is to do with the eurozone itself and, 
specifically, with the invention of the euro. Indeed, this book is about a paradox: 
European peoples, which had hitherto been uniting so splendidly, have ended up 
increasingly divided by a common currency”(6). 
What is insidious is the manner in which ‘representation,’ a fundamentally 
political modality is hijacked from the realm of the political to the domain of 
economic institutions, such as Banks. When Banks become vehicles of 
representations rather than elected governments, or populist voices, what we have 
in play is a solvency market where those who have strong bank accounts 
automatically embody representation, i.e., banks become both the substance and 
mode of representation (Banks tautologously represent themselves and their 
economic sufficiency and might), whereas the weaker accounts neither “speak” nor 
“speak for.” What takes place behind the screen is the political shoring up of 
economic viability: the stronger nations, in the name of economics, anchor 
themselves to their national base, while the weaker nations are bereft both of 
economic viability and political clout.  As Varoufakis would have it.  “However, 
there was a great difference between Britain and countries like Greece: while 
Gordon Brown could rely on the Bank of England to pump out the cash needed to 
save the City of London, eurozone governments had a central bank whose charter 
did not allow it to do the same.  Instead, the burden of saving the inane bankers fell 
on the weakest citizens”(5). 
The point that Varoufakis is making is that the eurozone based on the common 
currency of the euro is nothing short of a program of neocolonial standardisation 
where the very standard is the carrier and implementer of distributive inequality. 
To put it differently, unlike the other vision of solidarity that held so much promise, 
this blueprint is one of dominant unification, or at best, hegemonic unification that 
resorts to the violence of representation, i.e., subordinates the performative and 
differential play of representation to the dictatorial needs of a false unity that 
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precedes and censors representation.  Thus, Europe speaking for itself in the name 
of the dominant economies is validated as the representation of a unified Europe 
whereas the self-representation of the PIGS of Europe is purged from Europe’s self 
image. The unification takes the form of a victory, a unification minus: a unification 
minus the political will of the weaker nations.  The other reality is that under these 
so-called new circumstances, the sovereignty of the nation state still matters. In the 
case of Britain, there is a one to one representational relationship between currency 
and sovereignty, whereas in the case of the diffuse eurozone, the stronger nations 
within the zone continue to be benefited by the euro on the assumption that the 
weaker nations will take the heat to keep the unification alive.   
In a recent essay, Etienne Balibar et al, commenting on the Brussels diktat, 
bring up, in the context of the Greek-German relationship, the question of history, 
of memory, counter-memory and amnesia, to remind us that we cannot understand 
the nature of the present crisis in isolation, and without reference to the European 
past.  This following passage from that incisive essay raises the crucial issue of 
perspective: the agreement, and the eurozone, from what or whose point of view. 
“Seen from Greece, the agreement seems to be well and truly like a diktat. 
Varoufakis went so far as to mention ‘Versailles,’ a provocative allusion to the 1918 
treaties which had well known repercussions for German history and the rest of the 
world. The accusation was sufficiently serious and credible for Merkel to state 
immediately that she is unconcerned with “‘historical comparisons’….”5 It is not 
surprising that history and memory should matter to the subaltern and not the 
dominant or the hegemonic. Once history is ruled out of ‘concern,’ prescriptions 
such as austerity measures for Greece and the weak nations can be administered as 
benign and neutral acts of restructuring, even if such measures result in the 
liquidation of the sovereignty of the subaltern nations.   
To get a diagnostic understanding of the eurozone situation, I turn again to the 
Balibar essay. Here is a passage that demonstrates how measures that are touted to 
be purely economic and institutional intend deep, far-reaching, deleterious political 
consequences for the weaker nations: that dire and radical upheavals in subaltern 
nations such as Greece have their cause elsewhere. What is indeed happening is the 
political dismantling of the weaker nations by extra-territorial forces and flows. 
The Greek plebiscite was in response not to an agenda from within, but from an 
imposition from without. It was in fact a profound anti-plebiscite masquerading as 
plebiscite. The fact that the Greek populist will had to be mobilised to accept a 
proposal that was not backed by their own Greek national imprimatur makes the 
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plebiscite anti-democratic.  A people on the brink were in fact were being asked to 
vote for or against political survival. 
 
Finally, it must be mentioned that the necessity for a governmental shuffle (meaning 
the entry of anti-Syriza parties and the expulsion of ‘radicals’) is a foregone 
conclusion in the corridors of the Brussels Commission. Materially, this means that 
the austerity measures and the trusteeship reinforce one another as policies, so that 
Greece is no longer a sovereign nation (in any sense since this process started years 
ago and was only halted by Syriza’s rise to power). Unfortunately what this means is 
not that Greece is entering into a shared sovereignty—judicially equal and politically 
organized as would imply a progression towards European federalism—but instead 
that it is bowing to the will of the master. Which ‘Master,’ however, are we talking 
about?  It is at this point that we must look at the other side of the coin: the 
EuropeanUnion. (Balibar et al)  
 
The question that Balibar is asking is: “In short, we must ask ourselves what sort of 
‘regime’ is modern Europe under?”  For indeed, what is happening, despite all the 
economic-institutional-bureaucratic camouflage, is a regime change by way of what 
Balibar and Jurgen Habermas, among many others, have called “a post-democratic 
fait accompli.”   While making the argument how “one power structure conceals 
another,” Balibar also drives home the truth that “the Commission, being now no 
more than a (proliferating) regulatory structure and transmission belt, lost the 
power of negotiation to the Eurogroup: a group established by no treaty and 
following no rule, whose internally elected president then serves as a spokesperson 
for the most powerful and most influential of the member states-Germany, in other 
words” (Balibar et al).  
How is Greece, or for that matter any of the weaker partners in any solidarity, 
supposed to deal with what is a systemic or structural fait accompli? The problem 
with a fait accompli is that it is indeed engineered in the name of dominance, with 
agency intended for the strong and withheld from others.  It is one thing to 
understand the fait accompli as fait accompli and persist under its jurisdiction 
helplessly and inevitably thus consecrating and naturalising the ‘done deal’ as part 
of reality; and it is something quite other to combat and repeal or reverse the done-
ness of the deal by opening up a different historiography. Should the latter move be 
envisaged from within deconstructively and strategically as a Gramscian war of 
position, or is a war of ‘maneuver’ conceivable from ‘without?’  As I have briefly 
commented earlier in the essay, the question mark that inflects the title of the 
Varoufakis book points towards a Gramscian pessimism of the intellect and 
optimism of the will.  In other words, the so called ‘negative wisdom’ that the ‘weak 
must suffer what the must’ is posed in the interrogative with the strong suggestion 
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of a revolutionary ‘break’ in the future from what seems a ‘must’ in the history of 
the present.   
It is vital that Varoufakis relies on the longue durée to recall ancient Greek 
history in active and meaningful conjuncture with the history of the present both to 
suggest that this is nothing new and simultaneously enable a recalcitrant will 
capable of saying No to the punishing inhumanity of the done deal.  I go again to 
the Varoufakis text. 
 
Forty years later, in 1988, while looking through Keynes’s papers and books at King’s 
College, Cambridge, I notices a copy of Thucydides’ Peleponnesian War in the 
original ancient Greek. I took it out and quickly browsed through its pages. There it 
was, underlined in pencil, the famous passage in which the powerful Athenian 
generals explained to the helpless Melians why ‘rights’ are only pertinent ‘between 
equals in power’ and, for this reason, they were about ‘to do what the pleased with 
them’.  It was because ‘the strong actually do what they can and the weak suffer what 
they must’ (p.19) 
 
Apart from the incisive juxtaposition of ancient Greece with Bretton Woods by way 
of Keynes, Varoufakis calls the bluff of an equality anchored in inequality and 
initiates the challenge of how to respond to the paralysing and demoralising 
imperative of such historical lesson that condemns the weak to the chronic “must” 
of suffering.  Is there even a way to answer back, reverse perspectives, and 
instrumentalise a different praxis on the basis of such a bleak knowledge, and move 
beyond the vicious impasse?  What can the Melians say or how can they respond 
from the heart of their abjection?  Is there a different lesson to be learned from this 
situation by whom, and in whose name?  And here is how the Melians respond in 
the Thucydides text. 
 
Then in our view (since you force us to base our arguments on self-interest, rather 
than on what is proper) it is useful that you should not destroy a principle that is to 
the general good-namely that those who find themselves in the clutches of misfortune 
should….be allowed to thrive beyond the limits set by the precise calculation of their 
power.  And this is a principle which does not affect you less, since your own fall 
would be visited by the most terrible vengeance, watched by the whole world. (20) 
 
This answer breaks out of the calculus that sets the ration between ‘power’ and the 
right to thrive, and in addition, articulates a compelling connection between ‘value’ 
and ‘interest’ and in the process transforms possibilities of vesting interest: not my 
interest versus yours in a zero-sum, winner take all world, but a world of mutual 
learning in the name of all participants.  Of course, there is the stern warning to the 
dominant self interest that there will be a time of comeuppance: in other the 
dominant self-interest is in a state of delusional triumph. 
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Under such conditions, how will or should Greece or other such perilously 
positioned weak nations in the European Union parse and understand and honor 
the solidarity to Europe? What dictates solidarity: politics, economics, culture, 
philosophy, ideology, spirituality, Christendom, Occidental Being?  Is solidarity a 
form of essentialism? What aspects of solidarity are breakable, and which 
fundamental and inalienable; and who decides? Is the axis of solidarity mono or 
polyvalent?  If Greece and a number of other subaltern nations in the European 
Union find themselves compared to third World nations on the basis of economic 
criteria, should they then realign themselves in an axis of solidarity with Southern 
non-European nations with whom they do share a common history: a genealogy 
repressed and disavowed by regimes of Colonial Modernity? Would such an 
“affiliation,” be in violation of a more natural ‘filiation’ with the West, Europe, 
Christendom?  Would Greece, Turkey, Italy, and so on look completely out of place 
in alignment with Asian and African nations? All solidarities come with a price. Of 
all the different bearers of solidarity such as class, culture, political ideology, race, 
ethnicity, etc. which one is to be stressed, and when and why? If class 
consciousness as Marx argued is not natural but the result of a critical and 
symptomatic and often counter-intuitive reading of reality, then perhaps, the time 
has come to re-identify and re-recognize Europe in the name of its weakest links. 
Out of such critical recognition, there could well emerge a different cartography of 
global relationality. 
However difficult it may be to predict or envision the contours of this 
revolutionary cartography to come, it is important to turn tables on the crisis and 
wrest knowledge away from the crisis in the name of the so-called loser. It is not a 
coincidence at all that Varoufakis dedicates his book to his mother thus. “For my 
mother Eleni, who would have savaged with the greatest elegance and compassion 
anyone contemplating the notion that the weak suffer what they must.” 
 
 
 
                                               
1 This motto goes all the way back to Louis Blanc (1851) and is popularised by Karl Marx in 
his 1875 Critique of the Gotha Program. 
 
2 It is not a coincidence that there was a popular ‘real life’ British TV show called “The 
Weakest Link” whose selling point was the identification and elimination of the weakest link 
in a team. 
 
3 See Ernst Renan, “What is a Nation?” in Nation and Narration, ed. Homi K. Bhabha. 
 
http://epublishing.ekt.gr | e-Publisher: EKT | Downloaded at 08/10/2019 04:17:45 |
R.Radhakrishnan, The Weak Must Not Any More Than The Strong 
 
 
 
 
 
Synthesis 9 (Fall 2016)                                                                                                                        136 
 
 
4 Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak’s essay, “Can the Subaltern Speak?” resonates well in this 
context. 
 
5 9 Etienne Balibar, Sandro Mezzadra, and Frieder Otto Wolf, “The Brussels diktat: and what 
followed,” open Democracy, July 2015. 
 
 
 
Works Cited 
 
Balibar, Étienne, Sandro Mezzadra, and Frieder Otto Wolf. “The Brussels diktat: and 
what followed,” openDemocracy, July 2015.  
                 https://www.opendemocracy.net/can-europe-make-it/etienne-balibar-
sandro-mezzadra-frieder-otto-wolf/brussels-diktat-and-what-follow 
 
Renan, Ernest. “What is a Nation?” Nation and Narration. Ed. Homi K. Bhabha. 
New York: Routledge, 1990: 8-22. 
 
 Spivak, Gayatri Chakravorty. “Can the subaltern speak?” Marxism and the 
Interpretation of Culture. Ed. C. Nelson and L. Grossberg. Urbana / 
Chicago: U of Illinois P, 1998: 272-313. 
 
Varoufakis, Yanis. And The Weak Suffer What They Must? Europe’s Crisis and 
America’s Economic Future. New York: Nation Books, 2016. 
Powered by TCPDF (www.tcpdf.org)
http://epublishing.ekt.gr | e-Publisher: EKT | Downloaded at 08/10/2019 04:17:45 |
